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Abstract  
In the given research we analyse how an agent can move towards leadership in a socio-economic 
network. For the node’s (i.e., agent’s) importance measure we use the Shapley value (SV) 
concept from the area of cooperative games. We consider SV as the node’s centrality that 
corresponds to the significance of the agent within the socio-economic network. Using the 
polynomial algorithm developed by Aadithya, Ravindran, Michalak, & Jennings (2010) to 
compute SVs we analyze the way of creating new linkages to increase an agent’s significance 
(i.e., importance) in networks.    
Keywords: socio-economic networks, Shapley value, leadership 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of agent’s (i.e., node’s) importance in the domain of networks is one of the core 
ideas in socio-economic network analysis.  Different evaluation methods exist. Degree (Freeman, 
1979), betweenness (Anthonisse, 1971; Freeman, 1977), and closeness (Beauchamp, 1965; 
Sabidussi, 1966) are the most widely known metrics that assess the structural centralities of 
nodes. The algorithmic measures of node’s authority are well represented in Kleinberg (1999) 
and Page, Brin, Motwani, & Winograd (1999), where the notion of authority is given based on 
the analysis of link structures.  An interesting approach to characterize the role of nodes within 
the networks is given by Scripps & Esfahanian (2007), where the community-based metric in the 
symbiosis with the degree-based measure is introduced in the context of nodes’ roles 
classification. 
Another methodology for analyzing node’s leadership and importance in networks is based on a 
game theoretic approach. Specifically, we employ the concept of the Shapley value (Shapley, 
1952) from the area of cooperative games. We employ the Shapley value concept developed by 
Aadithya et al. (2010) in order to analyze how the nodes’ leadership positions in networks can be 
strengthened by establishing new links. First, we consider basic network topologies since they are 
the base of any large-scale graph, and analyze the way to improve the influential power of nodes 
based on their Shapley value.    
In section 2 we provide the description of the Shapley value and its interpretation in terms of 
networks. Specifically, we describe the approach made by Aadithya et al. (2010) giving an 
illustrative example.  
Based on SV approach we represent the leadership formation algorithm that calculates the tuple 
of links to be established with initially the least influential node in order to make it as strong as 
possible.  The formalized algorithm is represented in section 3.  
Next, we apply our algorithm to four basic network topologies: “point-to-point”, “star”, “ring”, 
and mesh, which are the base of any large-scale network structure.  The results are presented in 
section 4. 
In section 5 we apply the leadership formation method to two real-world networks. 
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2. SHAPLEY VALUE AS AN AGENT’S IMPORTANCE MEASURE 
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1952) is a game theoretic approach that provides the solution for 
computing of players’ gains in cooperative games where the players’ contributions are non-equal. 
The formal definition of the Shapley value (SV) is well-described in Littlechild & Owen (1973) 
and Gul (1989). Specifically, the SV equation for the player i in the coalition game with n players 
is the following: 
𝑆𝑉𝑖(𝑣) = ∑
|𝑆|!(𝑛−|𝑆|−1)!
𝑛!𝑆⊆𝑁\{𝑖}
(𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆)),                                (1) 
where: 
N is a set of n players; 
S is a coalition of players; 
 𝑣 is the characteristic function: 2𝑁 → ℝ; 𝑣(Ø ) = 0. 
The Shapley value is characterized by different properties such as efficiency, symmetry, linearity 
etc. (Hart, 1989). 
The special interest for employing the SV approach in the area of socio-economic network 
analysis is based on its use to measure the importance of nodes. In other words, SV is interpreted 
as the level of the nodes’ importance within a network (Suri & Narahari, 2008; Gomez, 
González-Arangüena, Manuel, Owen, del Pozo, & Tejada, 2003).   
We employ the computational approach of the Shapley value as a centrality measure in networks 
that was developed by Aadithya et al. (2010). They introduced the idea of Shapley value “in the 
domain of networks, where it is used to measure the importance of individual nodes, which is 
known as game theoretic network centrality” (Aadithya et al., 2010).    
Consider graph G(V,E) and 𝑣𝑖 ∈ V. All nodes (i.e., neighbors), which are reachable from 𝑣𝑖  at 
most one hop within G(V,E) are denoted by 𝑁𝐺(𝑣𝑖) . The degree of node 𝑣𝑖  is defined by 
𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣𝑖). The SV interpretation for node 𝑣𝑖 in G(V,E) according to Aadithya et al. (2010) is the 
following: 
𝑆𝑉(𝑣𝑖) = ∑
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣𝑗)
,𝑣𝑗∈{𝑣𝑖}∪𝑁𝐺(𝑣𝑖)                                                         (2) 
 Based on equation (2) Aadithya et al. (2010) introduced an algorithm to calculate SVs for all 
nodes in the network: 
 
SV-COMPUTING: 
Input: Unweighted graph G(V,E)  
Output: SVs of all nodes in V(G)     
for each  𝑣 ∈ 𝑉(𝐺) do 
 ShapleyValue [𝑣]= 
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣)
; 
 For each 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣) do 
  ShapleyValue [𝑣] += 
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑢)
; 
  
end 
 
end 
return ShapleyValue;    
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The advantage of the given algorithm is the polynomial running time O(V+E) (Cormen, 
Leiserson, Rivest, & Stein, 2003)  to compute SVs for all nodes in G(V,E) based on equation (2). 
To illustrate how the algorithm works we consider the trivial example (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Example network for SVs computation 
 
We calculate SVs for three nodes following the algorithm: 
I. For node 1: 
 1) SV′(𝑣1) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣1)
=
1
1+1
=
1
2
  
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣1): 𝑢 ∈ {"𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3"}: 
 SV(𝑣1) = SV′(𝑣1) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺("𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3")
=
1
2
+
1
1+2
=
5
6
 
Thus, SV(𝑣1) =
5
6
 
 
II. For node 2: 
1) SV′(𝑣2) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣2)
=
1
1+1
=
1
2
  
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣2): 𝑢 ∈ {"𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3"}: 
 SV(𝑣2) = SV′(𝑣2) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺("𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 3")
=
1
2
+
1
1+2
=
5
6
 
Thus, SV(𝑣2) =
5
6
 
 
III. For node 3: 
1) SV′(𝑣3) =
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(𝑣3)
=
1
1+2
=
1
3
  
 2) 𝑢 ∈ 𝑁𝐺(𝑣3): 𝑢 ∈ {node 1, "𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 2"}: 
 SV(𝑣3) = SV
′(𝑣3) +
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(node 1)
+
1
1+𝑑𝑒𝑔𝐺(node 2)
=
1
2
+
1
1+1
+
1
1+1
=
4
3
 
Thus, SV(𝑣3) =
4
3
 
 
Obviously, node 3 has the highest SV, and nodes 1 and 2 have equal SVs. The given results 
satisfy the efficiency requirement (Hart, 1989). 
 
3. LEADERSHIP FORMATION ALGORITHM  
 
Based on the SV-COMPUTING presented by Aadithya et al. (2010) we developed the algorithm 
calculating the tuple of links that is to be established with initially the least influential node ‘x’ 
(i.e., node with the minimum SV in G(V,E)) in order to make it as strong as possible.  In other 
words, we are testing the links between node ‘x’, that is chosen initially for the improvement in 
terms of SV, and the other nodes ‘i’ in a network.  
Establishing the new link between node ‘x’ and node ‘i’ we consider two cases: 
CASE 1:  
We approve the newly established link between node ‘x’ and some other node ‘i’ if and only if 
SV-value increased for at least one of them and did not decrease for another one. 
CASE 2:  
We approve the newly established link if and only if SV-values increased for both nodes: ‘x’ and 
‘i’. 
The following procedures implement the leadership formation of the least influential node in 
network G(V,E): 
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CASE 1:  
LEADERSHIP-FORMATION: 
1 SV-COMPUTING(G); 
2 NODES-SORTING(G); 
3 x = SL[n]; 
4 k = 1; 
5 FOR i = k to n in SL: 
6           IF [edge (x, SL[i]) does not exist in G] AND [x ≠ SL[i]]: 
7           THEN: previous_SV(i) = SV(i); 
8          previous_SV(x) = SV(x); 
9          Establish test-edge (x, SL[i]); 
10          SV-COMPUTING (G); 
11          IF [previous_SV(i) < SV(i) AND previous_SV(x) ≤ SV(x)]  
12                   OR 
13               [previous_SV(i) ≤ SV(i) AND previous_SV(x) < SV(x)]: 
14          THEN: approve edge (x, SL[i]); 
15         NODES-SORTING(G); 
16        IF x ≠ SL[i]: 
17        THEN: k = 1; 
18        ELSE: return SV(x); 
19                    Stop calculations; 
20          ELSE: Erase edge (x, SL[i]); 
21       Roll back to SV- and SL-results that exclude edge (x, SL[i]); 
22       k = k + 1; 
23          ELSE: k = k + 1; 
24 return  SV(x) 
 
 
CASE 2:  
LEADERSHIP-FORMATION: 
1 SV-COMPUTING (G); 
2 NODES-SORTING(G); 
3 x = SL[n]; 
4 k = 1; 
5 FOR i = k to n in SL: 
6           IF [edge (x, SL[i]) does not exist in G] AND [x ≠ SL[i]]: 
7           THEN: previous_SV(i) = SV(i); 
8          previous_SV(x) = SV(x); 
9          Establish test-edge (x, SL[i]); 
10          SV-COMPUTING (G); 
11          IF [previous_SV(i) < SV(i) AND previous_SV(x) < SV(x)]: 
12          THEN: approve edge (x, SL[i]); 
13         NODES-SORTING(G); 
14        IF x ≠ SL[i]: 
15        THEN: k = 1; 
16        ELSE: return SV(x); 
17                    Stop calculations; 
18          ELSE: Erase edge (x, SL[i]); 
19       Roll back to SV- and SL-results that exclude edge (x, SL[i]); 
20       k = k + 1; 
21          ELSE: k = k + 1; 
22 return  SV(x)  
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NOTATION: 
 
NODES-SORTING(G): 
For graph G(V,E) we have SVs for all n=|G.V| nodes based on the SV-COMPUTING(G) results. Applying one 
of the sorting algorithms, such as Quick Sort, Heap Sort or Merge Sort (Cormen et al., 2003), we sort all 
nodes in descending order based on the corresponding SVs. NODES-SORTING(G) returns the sorted list of 
nodes  (SL), where SL[1] is the node with the max SV-value, and SL[n] is the node with the min SV-value.  
 
‘x’ is a node with the smallest SV. It is chosen for the leadership formation from the initial SL after the first 
SV-calculation. 
 
SL[i] is the i-th node in the list of nodes sorted by the SV-values.  
 
ALGORITHM’s OVERVIEW: 
 
Initially, we sort all nodes by their SV values. Consider the following: X is the least influential 
node and Y – initially the most influential node in the network. The process of the new link 
creation is the following: if X and Y are not connected then we link them; if X and Y are already 
connected then we link X with the next most influential node that becomes Y. Next, we measure 
their SVs. If SVs for both nodes of the newly established connection (i.e., link) has increased 
(case 2) or increased for at least one of them and did not decrease for another one (case 1) then 
we confirm the link establishment between X and current Y and update SV-values and SL-list. 
Otherwise, we erase the given link and connect X with the next node in the previously sorted list. 
We go through the sorted list of nodes until X gets the maximum possible SV (i.e., it becomes the 
most influential as possible).  On each iteration (i.e., every time we link X with the next node Y 
in the sorted list) we consider only the SV-gains for X and for the current Y. We do not consider 
the SV-modifications of the Y-nodes that have already been included in the coalition of the 
previous iterations. 
4. LEADERSHIP FORMATION IN DIFFERENT NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 
Any large-scale network consists of the trivial topologies with different characteristics (Haddadi, 
Rio, Iannaccone, Moore, & Mortier, 2008): 
- “point-to-point”, or “line”; 
- “star”; 
- “ring”; 
- Mesh, i.e., topologies that are based on the previous three types.   
According to the LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm the main goal is to improve the node 
with the minimum SV continuously until its SV will become the maximum possible in the 
network. In other words, we analyze how the “weakest” node (i.e., with minimum SV) in the 
network can become the most influential as possible (i.e., getting the maximum possible SV). In 
order to approach this goal we have to establish new links in a way that will improve an SV of 
the weakest node based on the LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm.  
In this paper we show how the given mechanism works for the basic network topologies (listed 
above) due to the fact that any large-scale network consists of different combinations of these 
topologies. The results are represented in sections 4.1-4.4. In section 5 we illustrate our approach 
based on two real-world examples. 
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4.1 “Point-to-point” topology 
“Point-to-point” is the simplest type of network topology. It is represented in Figure 2. Initially, 
we calculate SVs for all nodes following LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm. The SVs 
sorted results are represented in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. “Point-to-point” network topology in the initial 
state 
 
Table 1. Initial SVs in the “point-to-point” topology 
 
node Shapley value 
2 1.33 
1 0.83 
3 0.83 
 
Nodes 1 and 3 are the weakest. We choose node 1 to improve its SV. Since the link with the most 
influential node 2 already exists we create the link with node 3 (Figure 3). We recalculate SVs for 
all nodes in the modified network.  The results are represented in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. Modified “Point-to-point” network topology 
 
Table 2. Updated SVs in the modified topology 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.00 
2 1.00 
3 1.00 
 
Establishing the link between node 1 and node 3 we increase SVs for both of them by 0.17. Since 
the increment is positive we approve “node 1” – “node 3”. As the result, we get the fully 
connected graph and no other links can be created. Node 1 has got the largest possible SV value 
and its influence in the given topology became as powerful as for nodes 2 and 3.    
4.2 “Star” topology 
This type of network topology is characterized by the existence of a hub that is the most central 
node in the network. All other nodes in the network are connected to the hub by “point-to-point” 
connections (see Figure 4). We calculate the initial SVs for the nodes. The sorted results are 
represented in Table 3. 
 
Figure 4. “Star” network topology in the initial state 
 
Table 3. Initial SVs in the “star” topology 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.75 
2 0.75 
3 0.75 
4 0.75 
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Nodes 2, 3 and 4 are equally weak. We choose node 2 to improve its leadership within the 
network. It is already linked with the most influential node 1. Hence, we connect it to the next 
node in the sorted list, which is node 3. The modified network structure is represented in Figure 
5. Recalculating SVs for the network (see Figure 5) we get the results represented in Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. First modification of the “Star” network 
topology 
Table 4. SVs after the first modification 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.42 
2 0.92 
3 0.92 
4 0.75 
 
Based on Table 4 it is obvious that nodes 2 and 3 have improved their leadership positions: SVs 
increased by 0.17 for both of them. It means that we approve the link “node 2” – “node 3”. 
Since SV of node 2 is less than SV of node 1, we have to establish the new link with the node 
from the updated SL-list. Links “node 2 – node 1” and “node 2 – node 3” already exist. 
Sequentially, we establish the link with node 4. The resulted structure is represented in Figure 6. 
We recalculate SVs for the newly modified structure. The results are represented in Table 5. 
 
Figure 6. Second modification of the “Star” network 
topology 
 
Table 5. SVs after the second modification 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.17 
2 1.17 
3 0.83 
4 0.83 
 
 
Link “node 2 – node 4” improves the SVs for both nodes: ∆SV(“node 2”) = +0.25 and 
∆SV(“node 4”) = +0.08. Therefore, we approve the link “node 2 – node 4”. On this step we get 
the maximum SV for node 2, and its leadership position is the highest as well as for the hub (i.e., 
node 1). 
4.3 “Ring” topology 
“Ring” topology is characterized by the sequential “point-to-point” connections of odd or even 
number of nodes forming the cycle. First, we consider the structure with an even number of 
nodes, which is represented in Figure 7. Initially, we calculate SVs for the graph. Sorted results 
are represented in Table 6.  
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Figure 7. The initial state of the “Ring” network 
topology with even number of nodes  
Table 6. Initial SVs in the “Ring” topology with even 
number of nodes 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.00 
2 1.00 
3 1.00 
4 1.00 
 
According to Table 6, all nodes in the “Ring” topology have the equal level of leadership within 
the network. We select node 2 to improve its position by creating the link with node 4. The 
modified topology is represented in Figure 8. We recalculate SVs for the graph represented in 
Figure 8 (see Table 7). 
 
Figure 8. Modified “Ring” network topology with even 
number of nodes 
Table 7. Updated SVs in the modified topology 
 
node Shapley value 
2 1.17 
4 1.17 
1 0.83 
3 0.83 
 
 
Creating the link between nodes 2 and 4 we increase SVs for both of them by 0.17. Since the 
increment is positive we approve the link “node 2” – “node 4”. 
Obviously, node 2 achieved the highest influence within the network as well as node 4. 
 
Next, we consider the “ring” structure with an odd number of nodes (see Figure 9). We calculate 
the initial SVs. Results are represented in Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 9. The initial state of the “Ring” network 
topology with odd number of nodes  
Table 8. Initial SVs in the “Ring” topology with odd 
number of nodes 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.00 
2 1.00 
3 1.00 
4 1.00 
5 1.00 
 
 
 
According to Table 8 SVs of all nodes are equal. We choose node 1 in the list to improve its 
leadership position. We create the link “node 1 – node 3” (see Figure 10) and recalculate the SVs 
based on the updated structure (see Table 9). 
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Figure 10. First modification of the “Ring” network 
topology with odd number of nodes  
Table 9. SVs after the first modification 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.17 
3 1.17 
4 0.92 
5 0.92 
2 0.83 
 
 
We approve link “node 1 – node 3”, because the SVs for both nodes have been improved: 
∆SV(“node 1”) = +0.17 and ∆SV(“node 3”) = +0.17 
Next, we test the link “node 1 – node 4”. The updated structure is represented in Figure 11 and 
the resulting SVs are represented in Table 10. 
 
Figure 11. Second modification of the “Ring” network 
topology with odd number of nodes  
Table 10. SVs after the second modification 
 
node Shapley value 
1 1.37 
3 1.03 
4 1.03 
2 0.78 
5 0.78 
 
 
According to Table 10, we have a positive SV improvement for nodes 1 and 4. We get the 
maximum SV for the node 1 (i.e., SV=1.37), and its leadership position is the highest in the 
network. 
4.4 Mixed topology 
Mixed topology is represented by different topological combinations described in sections 4.1 – 
4.3. For the analysis we choose a symmetric mixed topology that includes “point-to-point”, “star” 
and “ring” based sub-graphs. The given network is represented in Figure 12. We calculate SVs 
and represent the sorted results in Table 11. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Mixed network topology in the initial state 
Table 11. Initial SVs in the mixed topology 
 
node Shapley value 
3 1.25 
5 1.25 
1 0.92 
2 0.92 
6 0.92 
7 0.92 
4 0.83 
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According to Table 11 node 4 is the least influential (SV=0.83). Since node 4 is already linked 
with the leading nodes 3 and 5, we connect it with node 1 that is the next most influential node in 
the sorted list. The resulting network is represented in Figure 13. The recalculated and sorted SVs 
are represented in Table 12. 
 
Figure 13. First modification of the mixed network 
topology 
Table 12. SVs after the first modification 
 
node Shapley value 
5 1.17 
1 1.08 
3 1.08 
4 1.00 
6 0.92 
7 0.92 
2 0.83 
 
Link “node 4 – node 1” improves the leadership positions for both nodes: ∆SV(“node 4”) = +0.17 
and ∆SV(“node 1”) = +0.16. Therefore, we approve link “node 4 – node 1”. 
Node 4 improved its SV, but nodes 1, 3 and 5 are still more powerful. Therefore, we create the 
link with the next node from the sorted list. Links “node 4 – node 1”, “node 4 – node 3” and 
“node 4 – node 5” already exist. Therefore, we connect to the next node from the sorted list, 
which is node 6. The modified graph is represented in Figure 14. Recalculating SVs for the 
modified graph we get the results represented in Table 13. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Second modification of the mixed network 
topology 
Table 13. SVs after the second modification 
 
node Shapley value 
4 1.20 
1 1.03 
3 1.03 
5 1.03 
6 1.03 
2 0.83 
7 0.83 
 
 
Based on the results in Table 13 we get a positive SV growth for both nodes: ∆SV(“node 4”) = 
+0.20 and ∆SV(“node 6”) = +0.11. Therefore, we approve link “node 4” – “node 6”. 
Based on two modifications of the mixed topology we conclude that node 4 became the most 
influential by creating two connections: with node 1 and node 6, respectively.  
It is important to notice that, running the LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm for different 
topologies, we have the results that satisfy Case 1 and Case 2 previously described in Section 3. 
However, as shown in the next Section, the computational process can be different depending on 
which case is employed.  
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5. TESTING ON THE REAL-LIFE NETWORKS 
5.1. The Florentine network of marriages 
 
We illustrate our approach based on the network of marriages between the most powerful 
families in 15
th
 century Florence (Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Jackson, 2010). The network’s 
structure is represented in Figure 15 and the initial SVs are given in Table 14. We represent how 
the family with the weakest leadership position can become the most powerful in the network 
following case 1 and case 2 of the LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm.  
 
Figure 15. Florentine network of marriages 
 
Table 14. The initial SVs for the Florentine network of marriages 
NODE SV 
  
NODE SV 
Acciaiuoli 0.643 Medici 2.060 
Albizzi 1.093 Pazzi 0.833 
Barbadori 0.726 Peruzzi 0.950 
Bischeri 0.900 Pucci 1.000 
Castellani 1.033 Ridolfi 0.843 
Ginori 0.750 Salviati 0.976 
Guadagni 1.450 Strozzi 1.200 
Lamberteschi 0.700 Tornabuori 0.843 
 
CASE 1: LEADERSHIP-FORMATION 
According to Table 14, node “Acciaiuoli” has the weakest position in the network (SV=0.643).  
Following the algorithm we establish the link with the most powerful node from the SV-based 
sorted list. Node “Medici” is the most powerful in the network (SV(“Medici”=2.06)), but the link 
“Acciaiuoli” – “Medici” already exists. Therefore, we check the link with the second most 
powerful node, which is “Guadagni”. The link “Acciaiuoli” – “Guadagni” is approved, because 
the node “Guadagni” improved its SV from 1.45 to 1.75, and SV(“Acciaiuoli”) has not changed. 
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Following the algorithm, we test the corresponding links. The results for all established links, 
sorted according to the approval order, are represented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.CASE 1: SVs based on the established links in the Florentine network of marriages 
LINK Shapley Value 
Start node End node Start node 
End node 
before after 
Acciaiuoli Guadagni 0.643 1.45 1.75 
Acciaiuoli Strozzi 0.726 1.2 1.417 
Acciaiuoli Albizzi 0.876 1.060 1.210 
Acciaiuoli Castellani 1.043 1.000 1.117 
Acciaiuoli Salviati 1.269 0.976 1.036 
Acciaiuoli Peruzzi 1.451 0.867 0.942 
Acciaiuoli Ridolfi 1.637 0.810 0.871 
 
CASE 2: LEADERSHIP-FORMATION 
Since links with node “Acciaiuoli” can be approved if and only if both nodes, that form the link, 
improve their SVs then links “Acciaiuoli” – “Guadagni” and Acciaiuoli” – “Strozzi” are not 
approved on the first two corresponding iterations. This is due to the fact that SVs for 
“Acciaiuoli” have not improved. The first approved link is with the third most powerful node 
“Albizi”. The link “Acciaiuoli” – “Albizi” is approved, because node “Acciaiuoli” improved its 
SV from 0.643 to 0.676 and node “Albizi” – from 1.093 to 1.376. The results for all further 
established links are represented in Table 16. 
Table 16.CASE 2: SVs based on the established links in the Florentine network of marriages 
LINK Shapley Value 
Start node End node Start node 
End node 
before  after 
Acciaiuoli Albizzi 0.676 1.093 1.376 
Acciaiuoli Guadagni 0.760 1.400 1.617 
Acciaiuoli Strozzi 0.876 1.200 1.367 
Acciaiuoli Castellani 1.043 1.000 1.117 
Acciaiuoli Salviati 1.269 0.976 1.036 
Acciaiuoli Peruzzi 1.451 0.867 0.942 
Acciaiuoli Ridolfi 1.637 0.810 0.871 
 
According to Tables 15-16, node “Acciaiuoli” has achieved the leader’s position with SV=1.637. 
The updated network’s structure is represented in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. The updated Florentine network of marriages 
 
5.2. Coauthorship network of the Norwegian School of Economics 
 
We illustrate the given Shapley-based leadership formation approach based on the coauthorship 
network of the Norwegian School of Economics (Belik & Jornsten, 2014). Its structure is 
represented in Appendix I. The given network is based on the scientific collaboration between the 
faculty members at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and their international academic 
publication records according to the ISI Web of Science for the period 1950 – Spring, 2014.  
Network’s nodes correspond to the NHH faculty members, and the edges correspond to the 
existing joint publications. More detailed information regarding the NHH coauthorship network 
is represented in Belik & Jornsten (2014). The initial SVs calculated for the network are 
represented in Table 17. 
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Table 17. The initial SVs for the NHH coauthorship network 
NODE SV 
  
NODE SV 
  
NODE SV 
node 1 0.912 node 37 0.7 node 84 0.667 
node 3 0.778 node 39 1.067 node 85 0.783 
node 4 0.778 node 40 0.625 node 86 0.976 
node 9 1.408 node 45 1.017 node 94 0.726 
node 10 0.917 node 50 1.033 node 97 0.7 
node 14 2.079 node 52 0.667 node 98 0.843 
node 16 0.875 node 53 0.992 node 102 0.833 
node 18 0.75 node 58 0.708 node 108 1.617 
node 21 0.667 node 60 0.875 node 109 1.843 
node 22 0.746 node 61 0.833 node 111 0.843 
node 24 0.875 node 65 1.492 node 112 0.676 
node 25 1.496 node 67 0.708 node 120 0.75 
node 26 1.733 node 68 1.587 node 122 1.583 
node 27 0.875 node 69 0.983 node 129 0.75 
node 29 0.917 node 70 1.992 node 130 0.667 
node 30 1.246 node 73 1.35 node 134 0.833 
node 31 0.611 node 76 0.667 node 137 1.417 
node 33 0.726 node 78 1.176 node 138 1.033 
node 34 0.817 node 81 1.117 node 142 0.667 
 
CASE 1: LEADERSHIP-FORMATION 
According to Table 17 node 31 has the lowest SV=0.611. We choose this node to improve its 
leadership position within the network following the algorithm.  
First, we check the link with node 14 that has the highest SV=2.079. However, link “node 31 – 
node 14” already exists in the initial network. Next, we check the second most powerful node 70 
(SV=1.992). We recalculate SVs for the network establishing link “node 31 – node 70”. As a 
result, we do not approve this link because SV(“node 31”) decreased from 0.611 to 0.556. The 
same situation occurs when we create the links with the third and the fourth most powerful nodes 
in the network.  Specifically, we do not approve links “node 31 – node 109” and “node 31 – node 
26” because SV(“node 31”) is decreased from 0.611  to 0.569 and from 0.611 to 0.587, 
respectively.  
Connecting node 31 to the fifth most powerful node 108 we get a positive result. We approve link 
“node 31 – node 108”, because node 108 improved its SV from 1.617 to 1.917, and SV(“node 
108”) has not decreased. 
Next, we follow the LEADERSHIP-FORMATION algorithm reporting only the cases when the 
links are approved. This is in order to avoid comments regarding the existing links and the links 
that do not give the SV improvement. The detailed results are represented in Table 18.  
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Table 18. Case 1: SVs based on the established links in the NHH coauthorship network 
LINK Shapley Value 
Start node End node Start node 
End node 
before  after 
31 108 0.611 1.617 1.917 
31 70 0.639 1.992 2.228 
31 109 0.714 1.843 2.025 
31 26 0.823 1.733 1.876 
31 68 0.942 1.587 1.706 
31 122 1.125 1.583 1.658 
31 25 1.222 1.496 1.593 
31 65 1.354 1.478 1.554 
31 137 1.544 1.417 1.458 
31 9 1.68 1.371 1.43 
31 73 1.816 1.35 1.403 
31 30 1.936 1.208 1.262 
31 78 2.098 1.158 1.192 
 
CASE 2: LEADERSHIP-FORMATION 
Following case 2 algorithm, node 31 has the smallest SV on the initial computational step. We do 
not approve the links with nodes 14, 70, 109 and 26. In contrast to case 2 we do not approve link 
31-108, because both nodes should improve SVs, but SV(“node 108”) did not change. The first 
approved link is “node 31” – “node 122”, because ∆SV(“node 31”) = +0.033 and ∆SV(“node 
122”) = +0.283. The results for the approved links are represented in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Case 1: SVs based on the established links in the NHH coauthorship network 
LINK Shapley Value 
Start 
node 
End 
node 
Start node 
End node 
before  after 
31 122 0.644 1.583 1.867 
31 70 0.672 1.992 2.228 
31 109 0.747 1.843 2.025 
31 26 0.857 1.733 1.876 
31 108 1.000 1.617 1.726 
31 68 1.125 1.587 1.688 
31 25 1.593 1.496 1.593 
31 65 1.354 1.478 1.554 
31 137 1.544 1.417 1.458 
31 9 1.680 1.371 1.430 
31 73 1.816 1.350 1.403 
31 30 1.936 1.208 1.262 
31 78 2.098 1.158 1.192 
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According to Table 19, node 31 has achieved the leader’s position with SV=2.098. The updated 
network’s structure is represented in Appendix II. 
It is important to notice that applying the Leadership-Formation algorithm we get the same SVs 
for both cases (i.e., Case 1 and Case 2) in the corresponding networks tested in this section. The 
only difference is the order of the links’ approvals.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analysed how to improve nodes’ influential power in networks based on a game 
theoretic approach. We employed the Shapley value concept adapted by Aadithya et al. (2010) to 
measure a nodes’ leadership in the domain of networks. We represented the leadership formation 
algorithm based on two different approaches of the link’s approval. Four basic network 
topologies were analyzed: “point-to-point”, “ring”, “star”, and mesh. We showed how the 
leadership position of the initially “weakest” node improves over the iterative structural 
modifications of different topological types.  We also gave the illustrative examples of how the 
Shapley-based leadership formation algorithm works in two real networks. First, we applied our 
method to the classical example of the Florentine network of marriages. Based on our 
computations we represented the set of links that could potentially help the weakest family 
become the leader in the network. The second example is a modern network of coauthorship 
relations at NHH. Here we showed which relations (i.e., coauthorship) should be established by 
the weakest faculty member to become the most powerful in the network. 
The given analysis is important in terms of large-scale networks where it is critically important to 
use calculation techniques with polynomial running time. The analysis of how the leadership 
formation proceeds in the basic network topologies is essential for understanding how influential 
power can be estimated and improved in different types of large-scale networks. 
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Appendix I 
The initial NHH coauthorship network 
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Appendix II 
The updated NHH coauthorship network 
 
 
 
